

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-13

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-11

NSAE-00 RSC-01 SSO-00 INRE-00 PRS-01 SP-02 DODE-00

PM-03 IO-03 L-02 OMB-01 DRC-01 /060 W

----- 001399

O 021000Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4286

INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 11329

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PINT KS JA

SUBJ: JAPAN-ROK DIFFICULTIES

REF: A. STATE 192471

B. SEOUL 5726

SUMMARY: THE JAPANESE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE DETERIORATING KOREAN SITUATION, BUT THEY FEEL THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE CONCILIATORY MOVES THEY CAN MAKE. I THINK THEY ARE WILLING TO TRY AND WILL WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH US AS THEIR OWN IDEAS EVOLVE. END SUMMARY.

1. I APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED OF AMBASSADOR HABIB'S INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH YASUKAWA. WE WILL OF COURSE BE FOLLOWING FOREIGN OFFICE AND OTHER INVOLVEMENT IN THIS PROBLEM CLOSELY AND REPORTING FULLY. DURING MY ROUND OF CALLS AND MEETINGS WITH JAPANESE ESTABLISHMENT LEADERS IN RECENT DAYS AND WEEKS, HOWEVER, I HAVE ALREADY BEEN LED BY THEM THROUGH A NUMBER OF DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF THE KOREAN QUESTION. SPECIFICALLY, ON THIS SUBJECT WITHIN THE PAST TEN DAYS OR SO I HAVE LISTENED TO FORMER PRIME MINISTER KISHI AND HIS QTE OLD MEN'S UNQTE  
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GROUP, FORMER FINANCE MINISTER FUKUDA, VICE FOREIGN

MINISTER TOGO, HIS PREDECESSOR HOGEN AND DEPUTY MINISTER TSURUMI. IN ADDITION EMBOFFS HAVE TALKED AT LENGTH WITH DIRGEN FOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS YAMAZAKI, KOREAN AFFAIRS SPECIALIST SEO, MOFA UN AFFAIRS OFFICERS AND ASSORTED PRESS AND TOP LEVEL BUSINESS CONTACTS.

2. THE KOREAN QUESTION OBVIOUSLY IS UPPERMOST IN THEIR MINDS AT THE MOMENT. IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO PERSUADE JAPANESE LEADERS OF THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO JAPAN OF KOREA, AND THE DIRE IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY AND JAPANESE SECURITY OF A DETERIORATING DOMESTIC SITUATION IN THE ROK AND FRAYING OF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THEIR CONCERN, IN FACT, PROBABLY ALREADY PREDISPOSES THEM TO SEARCH SERIOUSLY FOR MEASURES THEY CAN TAKE TO AMELIORATE GROWING TENSIONS.

3. THERE ARE SEVERAL MAJOR THEMES THAT HAVE EMERGED FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE WITH REMARKABLE CONSISTENCY:

A. ONE OF JAPAN'S PRIMARY NEEDS AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IS PEACE AND STABILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA. NORTH-SOUTH TENSIONS IN THE

KOREAN PENINSULA, WHICH LIE AT THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM, ARE THEREFORE A CONSTANT LONGRANGE WORRY FOR JAPAN.

B. THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF INSTABILITY ARE NOT SUBJECT TO SOLUTION BY JAPAN. THE JAPANESE BELIEVE THE RESPECTIVE LEVERAGES OF THE U.S., THE PRC AND THE USSR ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION.

C. THE CURRENT PROBLEM AS IT IS SHAPING UP AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, IS PRIMARILY ONE BETWEEN THE ROK AND JAPAN, AND THE GOJ MUST COPE WITH IT. I SENSE A RELUCTANT FACING UP TO THIS RESPONSIBILITY. THE IMPULSE TO TURN TO THE U.S. DIRECTLY FOR REMEDIAL ACTION HAS NOT YET BEEN OPENLY EXPRESSED.

D. WHILE THE PROBLEM IS PERCEIVED TO BE JAPAN'S FOR THE MOMENT, THE OBVIOUS TRILATERAL INTERESTS INVOLVING THE U.S. ARE ALSO RECOGNIZED, AND THE SENIOR PEOPLE WITH WHOM I HAVE TALKED ALL URGE CLOSER CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US. THEY CLEARLY HOPE FOR MORE THAN REMINDERS THAT KOREA IS IMPORTANT TO ALL OF US AND JAPAN MUST BEND OVER CONFIDENTIAL

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BACKWARD IN AN EFFORT TO SMOOTH THE DIFFICULTIES.

E. THE OVERALL KOREAN QUESTION IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS IS PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT SUBJECT THE GOJ WISHES TO COVER DURING OUR VARIOUS HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS THIS FALL.

4. I THINK THE GOJ IS SERIOUSLY STUDYING MEASURES IT FEASIBLY CAN TAKE, AS SUGGESTED TO YASUKAWA (REF. A). OUR

CONTACTS IN THE FONOFF CONFIRM PRESS ACCOUNTS IN THE  
PAST COUPLE OF DAYS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO  
TAKE PRESIDENT PARK'S DEMARCHE SERIOUSLY. I WOULD ASSUME,  
HOWEVER, BASED ON OUR TALKS IN RECENT DAYS, THAT THE GOJ FEELS  
ITSELF INHIBITED BY SEVERAL FACTORS:

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ACTION EA-13

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-11

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O 021000Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4287

INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 11329

LIMDIS

A. POLITICAL VULNERABILITIES --

IN ADDITION TO THE FAMILIAR CAPABILITY OF THE OPPOSITION  
TO EXPLOIT THE KOREAN ISSUE AT TANAKA'S EXPENSE, THE  
PM'S ADMINISTRATION ITSELF IS CLEARLY NOT  
IN A STRONG POSITION TO TEST THE OUTER LIMITS OF POLITICAL  
TOLERANCE. THE KIND OF QTE NO-WIN UNQTE POSITION WITH  
WHICH TANAKA IS CONFRONTED ON KOREA INEVITABLY OPENS THE  
POSSIBILITY OF INTRAMURAL CRITICISM AND ATTACK IN THE  
CONTEXT OF THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE LAUNCHED  
THIS SUMMER BY FUKUDA. IN GENERAL, THE SENSE OF CRISIS  
THAT IS AGAIN GROWING WITHIN THE LDP DOES NOT PROVIDE  
A STRONG POLITICAL BASE FOR LEADERSHIP DECISIONS ABOUT  
THE SENSITIVE KOREAN PROBLEM.

B. LEGAL LIMITATIONS -- WE ARE NOT CLEAR THE EXTENT TO  
WHICH GOJ HANDS ARE TIED BY DOMESTIC LAWS IN PURSUING  
INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS AS REQUESTED BY  
THE ROKG. THE CLAIMS OF THE GOJ WOULD SEEM ON THE SURFACE  
TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE VALIDITY, BUT WE ARE MINDFUL  
OF THE ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL CONDITIONS ON WHICH GOJ  
HANDLING OF THE KOREAN MINORITY HAS RESTED IN THE PAST.

WE ARE SEEKING A BASIS FOR MORE FACTUAL JUDGMENT ON THIS POINT.

C. EMOTIONAL FACTOR -- WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO CAPSULIZE THIS HISTORICAL REALITY, IT OBVIOUSLY COLORS THE PRESS TREATMENT OF KOREA-RELATED STORIES AND AFFECTS THE RE-CONFIDENTIAL

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CEPTIVITY OF THE GENERAL POPULACE TO JAPANESE LEADERSHIP STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS. IT IS DEEP-SEATED AND SERIOUS. D. PERSONALITIES -- ALTHOUGH A SECONDARY CONSIDERATION, WE ARE FINDING THAT A NUMBER OF THE FONOFF AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE INVOLVED IN CONCERN ABOUT KOREA REGRET THE PROPENSITY FOR VOLUBLE TALK AND GRATUITOUS COMMENT OF THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS PRIME MINISTER. THEY HAVE PRIVATELY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MOST OF THE TROUBLESOME STATEMENTS THAT HAVE SPARKED KOREAN EMOTIONS EXCEEDED PREPARED TALKING POINTS AND GOOD SENSE. AMBASSADOR HABIB'S CALL FOR CARE AND RESTRAINT IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS (REF A), THEREFORE, IS A SOUND POINT. THE JAPANESE RECOGNIZE THIS ALREADY, HOWEVER, AND THERE LIKELY IS LITTLE FURTHER THAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT -- ESPECIALLY BY US.

5. I THINK THE APPROACH TO YASUKAWA MAY HAVE BEEN HELPFUL -- INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION AS VIEWED FROM OUR SIDE. THE JAPANESE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WANT TO MAINTAIN CLOSE AND FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS WITH US ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM. THIS MAY BE CLOSE TO THE MAXIMUM THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR, BUT IN THIS SPIRIT I THINK WE CAN CONTINUE TO MAKE OUR INPUTS TO JAPANESE THINKING AS WE PURSUE OUR NORMALLY CANDID DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM AT VARIOUS LEVELS. IT WOULD MAKE A DIFFERENT BALL GAME OF IT IF WE GRATIFIED KOREAN DESIRES BY REPORTING BACK TO THEM THAT WE HAD LEANED ON THE GOJ. I IMAGINE THE JAPANESE WILL WONDER IF WE HAVE ALSO BEEN COUNSELING RESTRAINT ON THE ROK SIDE.

6. I WOULD SUMMARIZE MY IMPRESSION OF GOJ THINKING AT THE MOMENT AS BEING GENERALLY MOTIVATED -- ALBEIT SOMEWHAT RELUCTANTLY -- IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. THEY RECOGNIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM FOR JAPAN AND THE REGION, AND I BELIEVE THEY WILL EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND PATIENCE AND TAKE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION. THEIR PERFORMANCE MAY BE SLOWER THAN WE WOULD LIKE, AS NONE OF THEM HAVE A CONFIDENT BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION. WE SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT ABOUT THE PROBLEM, INFORMALLY INSERTING OUR PERCEPTIONS OF THE ROK SCENE AND IDEAS  
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ABOUT HELPFUL ACTIONS INTO THEIR THINKING AS WE GO ALONG,  
BUT WE SHOULD REMAIN OUTSIDE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.  
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## Message Attributes

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